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Summit and the Question of Unilateralism
More than a decade after the world did nothing to halt genocide in
Rwanda, and in the shadow of ongoing atrocities in Darfur, Sudan, the
international community recently made a new commitment to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity. The United Nations 2005 World Summit brought together
representatives from more than 170 countries, including the United States.
While largely reiterating previous international development and security
goals, the Summit culminated with an agreement that the international
community, acting through the United Nations, bears a responsibility to help
protect populations from genocide and other atrocities when their own
governments fail to do so. The agreement further announced a willingness to
take "collective action" through the Security Council to protect populations if
peaceful means prove inadequate.'
The motivating force behind the agreement is the United Nations' past
inaction in the face of grave atrocities, including genocide. At the conclusion of
the World Summit, Secretary General Kofi Annan told the world's leaders:
"[Y]ou will be pledged to act if another Rwanda looms."2 However, by
describing the responsibility to protect in terms of U.N. action, the World
Summit failed to address a critical issue: What can and should be done by
individual states if the United Nations fails to fulfill its pledge? The answer to
this question will inform the scope of permissible unilateral action, with
implications for future humanitarian interventions and military actions.
1. 2005 World Summit, Sept. 14-16, 2005, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 139, U.N. Doc.
A/6o/L.i (Sept. 20, 2005).
2. Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Address to the 2005 World Summit (Sept. 14, 2005),
available at http ://www.un.org/webcase/summit20o5/statements/spenglish3.pdf.
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This Comment argues that the Summit agreement strengthens the legal
justification for limited forms of unilateral and regional action-including
military action-if the United Nations fails to act to protect populations from
genocide and other atrocities. The Summit agreement strengthens the
justification for unilateral action in two main ways. First, the agreement
affirms important limits on national sovereignty by recognizing a state's
responsibility to protect its own citizens. Second, the agreement sets clear
responsibilities for the international community when a country fails to protect
its own citizens. In cases of U.N. inaction, would-be unilateral actors can point
to an explicit failure to fulfill a duty.
However, the agreement only supports unilateral action in a narrow set of
circumstances. First, the agreement is limited to a small set of extreme human
rights abuses. Second, the agreement implies a hierarchy of actors and of
interventions: Good faith U.N. action is privileged over unilateralism and
peaceful action is privileged over violent means. Finally, the agreement limits
the scope of intervention to the goal of protection. For these reasons, the U.S.
invasion of Iraq could not have been justified using the Summit agreement.
I. THE SUMMIT AGREEMENT FRAMEWORK
The Summit agreement is an important contribution to international law.
It builds on recent trends in international law and practice3 and codifies them
in an agreement that nearly every country in the world participated in forming.
As such, it strengthens the development of a new international norm regarding
humanitarian protection.
The agreement recognizes that while the responsibility to protect begins
with national governments, it does not end at nations' borders. Thus, while
"[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,"4 when a
3. The Summit codifies a norm of protection that emerged in the 199os. For example, the 1994
Rwandan Genocide prompted arguments among international lawyers and policymakers
that international actors had a right, and even a duty, to prevent genocide. See SAMANTHA
POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 359-62 (2002);
Stephen J. Toope, Does International Law Impose a Duty upon the United Nations To Prevent
Genocide?, 46 MCGiLL L.J. 187, 187 (2000). The United Nations has also supported
interventions on humanitarian grounds, such as in Somalia. INT'L COMM'N ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT 16 (2OO1)
[hereinafter THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT], available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/
Commission-Report.pdf.
4. 2005 World Summit, supra note 1, 138.
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state fails to do so, "[t]he international community, through the United
Nations, also has the responsibility."' Moreover, the agreement calls for
coercive action through the Security Council, including economic sanctions or
even military action, as a last resort to protect populations:
[W]e are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter,
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.
6
While the decision to intervene will be made on a case-by-case basis, the
agreement emphasizes the need for "timely and decisive" action when peaceful
persuasion is inadequate. In particular, the agreement broadens the concept of
"international peace and security ' 7 that underlies Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, which permits coercive action by the Security Council.8 Most previous
Chapter VII actions, particularly humanitarian interventions, either nominally
involved the consent of the nation in question or were justified in the name of
regional security.9 In contrast, the Summit agreement suggests that Chapter
VII action is also appropriate for purely internal matters when peaceful means
are inadequate and national authorities are failing to protect their populations.
Violence need not cross borders to justify Security Council involvement when
certain international human rights norms are being violated.
However, while the Summit agreement is an important statement
regarding the duties of the international community, it fails to address whether
the United Nations is the only international actor that can exercise the
responsibility to protect, or merely the preferred actor. The Summit's failure to
consider unilateralism is not surprising. The agreement articulates a clear
responsibility for the United Nations to act. The need for unilateral or regional
action would therefore become an issue only if the United Nations failed to
fulfill its duties, something that the drafters may have preferred not to
countenance. That said, the dilemma will almost certainly emerge, because the
5. Id. 139.
6. Id.
7. See U.N. Charter arts. 42, 43, 47, 48, 51.
8. Id. arts. 39, 41, 42.
9. See Adam Roberts, The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 71, 81 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).
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Summit agreement does not address the structural issues that thwart effective
U.N. action to protect vulnerable populations.
First, the structure of the United Nations does not foster quick and decisive
responses. Vetoes by the permanent members of the Security Council-or even
threats of vetoes-can undermine effective international action. Bureaucratic
hurdles and diplomatic negotiations can be time-consuming, making it
difficult to respond to rapidly unfolding events. More generally, any form of
international coercion is usually diplomatically and politically costly, creating a
strong incentive for international actors to avoid difficult measures. The
international response to the crisis in Darfur is illustrative. China, which has
ties to the Sudanese government and enjoys a permanent seat on the Security
Council, was reported to have opposed coercive measures like sanctions.1" The
first Security Council resolution that took any direct action against the
perpetrators of human rights abuses was not passed until March 29, 2005, two
years after the violence began. Even today, ethnically targeted violence and a
"'culture of impunity"' continue in Darfur."
Second, the World Summit failed to agree to measures that would reduce
the likelihood of strategic behavior among Security Council members to
undercut action. Due in large part to U.S. pressure,12 the final Summit
agreement removed proposed language that called on permanent Security
Council members "to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."" This gap leaves
permanent members with a powerful negotiating tool, permitting bad faith
vetoes in the face of clear atrocities. The agreement's limitation of coercive
measures to a "case-by-case" basis 4 further encourages such bad faith actions.
io. Sudan Warns Against Intervention, BBC NEWS, July 27, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
/hVafrica/3931411.stm.
ii. Jonah Fisher, "Culture of Impunity" in Darfur, BBC NEws, Sept. 26, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/africa/ 4 2839 56.stm (quoting Juan Mendez, U.N. Special Advisor
on Genocide).
12. See Colum Lynch, U.S. Wants Changes in U.N. Agreement, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2005, at AI.
13. See Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of
September 2005 Submitted by the President of the General Assembly, 120, U.N. Doc.
A/ 5 9/HLPM/CRP.1i/Rev.2 (Aug. 1o, 2005).
14. 2005 World Summit, supra note 1, 139.
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II. SUPPORT FOR UNILATERAL ACTION
State practice,'" academic commentary," and a close reading of the U.N.
Charter itself 7 suggest that unilateral (or regional) intervention in the absence
of U.N. action may be acceptable under some circumstances. The Summit
agreement strengthens the case for unilateral action in the absence of U.N.
action but also suggests key parameters limiting the scope of permissible
intervention.
First, the agreement affirms important limitations on national sovereignty
that have developed over the last two decades. The agreement draws upon the
work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS), which introduced the concept of a "responsibility to protect" in a 2001
report.18 The report rejected the view that sovereignty provides governments
with full autonomy over their territories. Rather, it found there was an
international consensus that sovereignty entails responsibilities as well as
rights.1 9 When individual states fail to protect their own populations, they have
no sovereign right to nonintervention. Instead, "non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect."
2 0
The World Summit affirmed this view of sovereignty, defining protection
as a responsibility and empowering the international community to fulfill that
is. For example, NATO's unilateral action in Kosovo was not condemned by the Security
Council or "in the wider society of states." Nicholas J. Weeler, The Humanitarian
Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military
Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 9, at 29, 30.
16. See FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 150 (1997); Roberts, supra note 9, at 85.
17. Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter oblige states to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the United Nations in defense of human rights. While Article 2(4) of the
Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of a state or in a manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations, humanitarian intervention is not aimed at the territorial integrity of a state
and is consistent with human rights principles. See Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal,
Humanitarian Intervention To Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 167, app. A at 175-77 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); see also Julie Mertus,
Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons From Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1743, 1751 (2ooo) ("A close reading of the U.N. Charter supports humanitarian
intervention in Kosovo-like situations . .. in which an outside alliance acts unilaterally to
redress human rights violations.... ").
18. See THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 3.
19. Id. at 8.
2o. Id. at xi.
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duty if a nation fails to do so. 21 The text of the agreement is limited to U.N.
action, but its implications are much broader. The agreement undermines the
objection that unilateral coercive action violates national sovereignty. If nations
have no sovereign right to commit or passively permit atrocities against their
own populations, then they cannot object on sovereignty grounds to coercive
actions halting the commission of those atrocities. Sovereignty simply does not
extend that far. This understanding of sovereignty does not affirmatively
establish the legality of unilateral action, but it does undercut an important
legal objection.
Second, the agreement sets a new standard for the United Nations and the
international community as a whole: Failure to take action to protect
populations from genocide and other atrocities is failure to fulfill a clearly
acknowledged duty. Thus, the agreement asserts a "responsibility" for the
international community, acting through the United Nations, to protect
populations from genocide,22 and declares that the United Nations is
"prepared" to take "timely and decisive" coercive action if peaceful means prove
inadequate . 3 Incidents of genocide and other atrocities are no longer merely
morally reprehensible or violations of an individual nation's responsibilities,
and failure by the international community to respond is no longer simply
morally blameworthy. Rather, the failure to act is a dereliction of a clearly
articulated institutional duty, implicating not only individual states, but also
the United Nations. If the United Nations fails to act, it is institutionally
broken, at least with respect to the case at hand.'
In the absence of a functioning international institution, one must look to
the overriding purpose of the Summit agreement: a pledge to prevent another
Rwandan genocide. s It would be perverse to argue that members of the
international community cannot respond individually to vindicate the purpose
of the agreement, particularly in light of the U.N. Charter's commitment to
human rights.26 Rather than acting illegally, states would be acting in a legal
21. 2005 World Summit, supra note 1, 138-39.
22. Id. 139.
23. Id.
24. See W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive
Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 3, 17 (2000)
(observing that the U.N. system has difficulty responding to grave human rights abuses and
arguing that these abuses "will sometimes be addressed by forms of unilateral action that
the international legal process may, in context, deem lawful, but that manifestly fail a test of
formal legality under the UN Charter").
25. See Annan, supra note 2.
26. See U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56; supra note 17.
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void opened by U.N. inaction and with the purpose of addressing an
institutional failure. Even ICISS leaves open the possibility of unilateral action
in such circumstances:
[I]f the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention
where humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or
the Council fails to deal with such a proposal within a reasonable time,
it is difficult to argue that alternative means of discharging the
responsibility to protect can be entirely discounted.27
While terms such as "reasonable time" are not clearly defined, they do suggest
a framework with which to consider the permissibility of unilateral action.
Indeed, under the agreement, unsanctioned action may be the only means of
avoiding complicity in the failure to protect.
III. LIMITATIONS ON UNILATERAL ACTION
While the agreement strengthens the case for unilateral responses to
protect populations from genocide and other atrocities, it also suggests
important limitations that affect how the agreement might be utilized by future
unilateral actors, particularly the United States.28 The ongoing war in Iraq is an
elephant in the room when discussing the justifiability of unilateral action in
the face of U.N. inaction. The Summit agreement, however, provides only
weak support for interventions such as the invasion of Iraq.
First, the Summit agreement is limited to a small set of extreme human
rights abuses. The responsibility to protect is defined to apply to genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The agreement does not
address the many other rights articulated in previous human rights
conventions, such as political freedom and economic rights. Therefore,
justifications for the war based on bringing democracy to Iraqis29 are not
relevant under the agreement. Likewise, justifications for intervention based on
the war against terror are not relevant because the agreement relates to
intervention when a government fails to protect its own population, not
external populations. Saddam Hussein's regime did commit ethnic cleansing
27. THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 3, at 53.
28. See Melvin P. Leffler, Bush's Foreign Policy, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 22; Richard
L. Morningstar & Coit D. Blacker, World Orders: Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism, HARV.
INT'L REV., Fall 2004, at 74.
29. E.g., President's Remarks to the National Endowment for Democracy, 41 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1502 (Oct. 6, 2005).
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and crimes against humanity in the past, such as the gassing of the Kurdish
population in 1988.30 The Summit agreement, however, requires evidence that
a government is currently failing to protect its population against such
atrocities. Thus, for the agreement to have been used to justify U.S.
intervention, the United States would have had to make qualitatively different
arguments, showing ongoing atrocities on the level of genocide, ethnic
cleansing, or crimes against humanity occurring in Iraq, as well as the
international community's unwillingness to prevent them.
Second, the Summit agreement implies a hierarchy of actors and of
interventions: Good faith U.N. action is privileged over unilateral intervention,
and peaceful action is privileged over violent means." Individual states are
obliged to explore every possible avenue through the United Nations before
acting unilaterally, including action through the General Assembly. Consider,
for example, the ongoing violence in Darfur. Under the agreement, the United
States has a duty to advocate for increased action through the United Nations
and to provide logistical or even military support to U.N.-sanctioned African
Union peacekeepers,32 who are grossly under-equipped.3 But it would not be
appropriate for the United States to unilaterally intervene militarily in Sudan at
this stage, because it is not apparent that the United States has exhausted all
available U.N. tools.
Likewise, the agreement clarifies that the international community is
"prepared '34 to intervene coercively only when peaceful means are ineffective.
While this does not necessitate trying every noncoercive means before
intervening, it does require fairly examining all diplomatic options. It also
requires efforts to establish early warning facilities, so as to prevent atrocities
before they begin." Given that the purpose of the agreement is to protect
30. See Charges Facing Saddam Hussein, BBC NEws, July 1, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hV
middle east/332o293.stm.
31. 2005 World Summit, supra note 1, 139.
32. S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004) ("[w]elcoming the leadership role and
the engagement of the African Union to address the situation in Darfur and expressing its
readiness to support fully these efforts").
33. The International Crisis Group estimates that a force level of 12,000 to
15,000 troops is required in Darfur. The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps (Int'l
Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No. 28, July 6, 2005). However, as of October 2005, Human
Rights Watch estimated that there were only 7000 African Union personnel in Darfur,
including 4890 troops and 1176 civilian police. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENTRENCHING
IMPUNITY: GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DARFUR 7 (2OO5),
available at http://hrw.org/reports/2oo5/darfur12os/.
34. See 2005 World Summit, supra note i, 139.
35. Id. 138.
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civilians, military means must be the last resort and must be calculated to
minimize the threat to human life. There is a full spectrum of coercive
measures available short of a full invasion, including economic tools such as
sanctions and asset freezes, and military actions such as no-fly zones or the
bombing of military installations.
Finally, the scope of the international response must be limited to
protecting a population from genocide or other atrocities. While the Summit
agreement redefines sovereignty, it does not do away with it altogether. In
particular, nations still retain sovereign rights, including territorial integrity,
under the U.N. Charter?6 The agreement clarifies that territorial integrity is
not violated by international protection, but military interventions must be
targeted, and regime change or other highly intrusive measures are only
justifiable if absolutely necessary for the protection of populations.
CONCLUSION
While the Summit agreement does not justify broad-based unilateral
intervention, opportunistic nations may still use the rhetoric of the agreement
to justify such action. More generally, it is likely that future justifications for
military interventions will include an examination of the human rights
conditions within a given country, and that future unilateral actors will make
arguments drawing on the duty to prevent genocide and other atrocities in
addition to claims of self-defense or international security. However, the
Summit agreement does not thereby hearken a breakdown in international
order. There is a risk that a nation could use claims of genocide or other
atrocities as a ruse to invade another country. If such claims were truly without
substance, however, or if the intervention exceeded what was necessary to
protect populations, the intervention would still be illegal and could justify
Security Council action against the invading state. The fact that human rights
language can be coopted by bad faith actors does not mean that such standards
have no meaning. Rather, the Summit agreement shifts the terms of the debate
to the accuracy of a unilateral actor's claims and to the necessity of the
proposed response.
ALICIA L. BANNON
36. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain ... from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State .... ").
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